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This  paper  puts  forward  an  innovative  construct  called  the  Statute  of  Governance,  by 
which a company can foster and enhance its corporate governance. The paper argues that 
it is not enough to list some principles of governance and a set of related good practices, 
as  the  Australian  Stock  Exchange  has  done,  albeit  it  comprises  the  best  available 
guidelines for the time being. We contend, however, that a step further should be taken, 
consisting of a Statute of Governance designed and passed by the Board, voted through 
by  stockholders,  and  enacted  by  the  management.  Such  statute  is  a  pivotal  linkage 
between principles and good practices, because it becomes enforceable from within the 
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Corporate Governance does matter and if we neglected it, as empirical evidence of 
corporate  fraud  and  misconduct  have  been  unmasking  in  the  last  decades, 
companies would impair their growth in value as well as in reputation; still worse, 
they risk failure and survival. It is not surprising, hence, that there has been a wave 
of compelling apprehension from the side of regulators and private players in the 
field of business who realized, at last, the need of raising standards of corporate 
behavior by sticking to more reliable practices
1. 
 
The process of improving standards and practices has come about either from a 
compulsory viewpoint, just as Sarbanes-Oxley ultimately did in the aftermath of 
Enron’  demise,  or  from  a  purposeful  but  softer  frame  of  mind  which  takes 
advantage of available benchmarks produced by commerce chambers, world-wide 
institutions
2, central banks, or securities exchanges, like the one issued in 2007 by 
the Australian Stock Exchange, perhaps the best in the world so far.  
 
However,  valuable  as  those  tools  turn  out  to  be,  they  mostly  apply  to  listed 
companies only. But it is for the sheer life of real markets to provide the observer 
with another picture, by which thousands of companies are not listed. In point of 
fact, many countries do not enjoy a thriving capital market for public placements 
and they remain under dissimilar governance styles, on which private placements 
favored by banks and institutional investors are the rule by and large
3.  
 
                                                 
1 A comprehensive analysis of good practices around the world can be found in the book edited by 
professor Lopez Iturriaga (2009). 
2 Mainly through the OECD, Bank for International Settlements (the Basel Bank), the World Bank, 
the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, which have been very active in the field of 
governance. 
3 On this consequential topic, the reader is referred to Carey et al. (1993) and Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1996) for good introductions.   4 
This paper sets forth an alternative proposal to improve the corporate governance 
in thousands of not-listed companies that have almost remained on the sidelines of 
the conventional debate about governance. For instance, family owned companies 
doing  business  in  countries  where  public  offers  are  scarce,  and  for  which 
transparency  and  accountability  are  culturally  mistrusted  by  owners  and 
managers
4. This line of research draws on an earlier contribution from the author 
that focused on the foundational charter of any organization (Apreda, 2007c). We 
point out that our proposal it also holds and comes in handy for all those countries 
where  public  offers  and  sound  capital  markets  are  deeply  ingrained  into  the 
paradigm of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance. 
 
In section 1 we deal with a functional definition of Corporate Governance broad 
enough to encompass most organizations all over the world. Next, in sections 2 
and 3, we give heed to principles of governance and good practices, respectively. 
It is for section 4 to delve into the Australian Stock Exchange proposal of principles 
and practices for listed companies. Section 5 will introduce the main contribution of 
this paper, the Statute of Governance. Afterwards, a contrast will be made between 
the  Australian  proposal  and  the  Statute  of  Governance.  Finally,  a  pragmatic 
viewpoint on the Statute of Governance will follow. 
 
 
1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 





                                                 
4 For a comparative analysis of styles of governance fostered by different legal traditions the book 
by Mark Roe (2003) is a provocative essay worthy of being read. 
5  The  framework  of  this  definition  has  been  drawn  on  Apreda  (2006a),  The  Semantics  of 
Governance.     5 
Definition 1    Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate Governance consists in a manifold and intertwined set of variables of 
analysis,  comprising  decision-making  processes,  organizational  structures  and 
long- term goals, namely: 
 
·  the ownership structure of the organization as well as owners’ rights;  
·  the board of directors goals, as well as the fulfillment of their fiduciary duties 
and the scope of their control rights;  
·  the  senior  management  tasks,  as well  as  the  fulfillment  of  their  fiduciary 
duties and the scope of their decision rights; 
·  the  relationship  with  creditors  and  the  design  of  covenants  on  behalf  of 
them; 
·  the fostering of both accountability and transparency; 
·  how to cope with conflicts of interests, their avoidance or resolution; 
·  incentives and rewards towards senior management and directors; 
·  looking after compliance risks; 
·  relationships with stakeholders comprising their rights and duties. 
 
The  preceding  definition  signals  the  denotative  dimension  of  corporate 
governance, by focusing on those variables of analysis that provide not only with a 
blueprint of the organization, but also stands for the complex web of relationships 
arising between stakeholders and the organization itself. Now we must take a step 
forward to inquire about the connotative dimension of corporate governance.  
 
Stakeholders of an organization are all those agents that lay claims, persistently 
along time, to things that they regard as legal rights entitled to them, or contractual 
duties  the  organization  has  committed  itself  to  bring  forward  on  behalf  of  the 
claimers. For this reason, they stake their claims, which are often competing and 
contestable, giving rise to conflicts of interests often so entangled that resolution is   6 
far  from  being  easily  attained.  And  this  is  the  point  where  accountability  and 
transparency come in to enhance the company’s relationships with stakeholders. 
 
Needless  to  say,  some  stakeholders  become  more  prominent  than  others:  for 
certain,  shareholders,  directors  and  managers  are  big  players  in  the  game  of 
staking claims. In this particular case, the design of a governance structure must 




2. REGULATORY AND DISCRETIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
For those of us committed not only to academic research on the subject, but also 
to private consultancy, it could not come as a surprise the pervading reluctance of 
managers and owners alike to realize that corporate governance is worthy of being 
included in their agendas. 
 
For all intents and purposes, corporate governance has a dual nature. On the one 
hand, it is what regulators request as a matter of fact; on the other hand, owners, 
directors and managers enjoy the advantage of improving the governance of their 
organizations  beyond  and  besides  regulators.  Let  us  look  at  this  matter  a  little 
closer.  
 
Whenever an organization is brought into existence, it will face a complex body of 
regulation to comply with, regarding the peculiar type of activity and scope that 
each  company  intends  to  carry  out.  For  instance,  a  public  company  must  be 
incorporated, which gives it a law-abiding corporate personality that entails both 
rights  and  liabilities.  Moreover,  a  well-defined  kind  of  information  has  to  be 
released in a compulsory way, either at incorporation date or, from that moment 
on, under the guise of periodic disclosures established by accountancy and fiscal   7 
duties, as well as claims from stock exchanges or ultimate lenders in the banking 
system. 
 
Broadly speaking, regulatory governance adds up to decision-making constraints. 
In the incorporation procedure, and for the sake of illustration, the company makes 
known its ownership structure, the board of directors constitution, how often they 
will  meet,  the  rights  of  block-holders  and  minorities,  the  way  directors  and 
managers  discharge  their  fiduciary  duties,  the  variegated  assortment  of 
commitments and responsibilities falling upon directors and managers, and so on. 
 
If  the  organization  does  not  fit  the  corporation  model
6,  being  a  cooperative  for 
example,  the  regulator  will  tell  the  founders  how  to  design  such  particular 
architecture, what sort of internal supervisory agency will be required, how wide-
ranging will be the scope of managerial functions, how to handle the conflicting 
roles  of  owners  or  beneficiaries  in  their  usually  strained  relationships  with  the 
senior management.  
 
Come  as  it  may,  there  is  no  way  out.  A  starting  stage  for  any  organizations 
prompts a ready-made design of governance that comes as a given fact of life on 
the grounds of regulation. We cannot contest such setting; on the contrary, we 
must follow what has been enacted so far. 
 
But  regulatory  governance  only  amounts  to  schematic  viewpoints  about  a 
variegated collection of organizations, leaving to the discretion of owners, directors, 
and managers the fine-tuning of corporate governance. Such degree of freedom 
must be welcomed since it will allow any organization to make a difference with its 
competitors, establishing profitable ties with stakeholders, fostering transparency 
and accountability, and nurturing a culture in the workplace that would increase the 
value  and  reliability  of  the  going  concern.  While  regulatory  governance  is 
                                                 
6 Hansman (2000) seems a worthy reference about the nature of a wide sort of organizations.   8 
compulsory, discretional governance springs up as a strategic craft, a pointer to 
growth and innovation in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
3. PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
If we looked back to Definition 1, we would ask ourselves whether a procedure 
could be devised to put into practice sound corporate governance structures. It is 
the  main  assertion  of  this  paper  that  such  procedure  consists  in  laying  the 
groundwork for a Statute of Governance out of principles of governance and good 
practices. Let us expand on the former, leaving for next section distinctive issues 
that underlie the latter. 
 
Definition 2    Principles of Governance 
 
By  principles  of  governance  we  mean  precepts,  that  is  to  say,  mandatory 
statements, stemming from the variables of governance to which each organization 
will commit itself to follow and hold true. 
 
The reader is referred to Exhibit 1 that lists on the right column the set of principles 
put forth in this paper. It will become apparent how the chosen principles directly 
stem from the variables of governance involved in Definition 1. 
 
   
4. CODES OF GOOD PRACTICES 
 
Precepts  are  a  necessary  step  just  to  build  up  well-founded  corporate 
governances, but they are not sufficient. By essence, they are commandments to 
do some things regarded as basic, almost to be accepted without opposition on 
behalf of the company’s interests.  
   9 
On the other hand, principles lack of functionality. They tell us “what we must do”. 
But they remain silent about how they should come down to earth. It will be for the 
so-called  “good  practices”  to  cope  with  this  problem,  installing  any  governance 
structure into the realm of practice. 
 
Definition 3    Codes of good practices 
 
By a code of good practices it is meant a list of rules of behavior that meet the 
following requirements: 
 
- each of them derive from a specific principle of governance; 
 
- they abide by the law and the regulatory setting within which the organization 
runs its daily businesses;  
 
- they are operational
7, that is to say, they are reliable, observable, contestable, 
and upgradeable.  
 
It  is  to  be  noticed  that  codes  of  good  practices  are  not  compulsory.  Broadly 
speaking, they are not regulated and this still holds for any country in the world. 
Instead,  what  we  find  everywhere  is  that  chambers  of  commerce,  securities 
exchanges  commissions,  or  groups  of  interest  provide  companies  with 
benchmarks, ready-made formats, mainly focusing on listed companies. 
 
As time passes by, nevertheless, an increasing number of regulatory bodies and 
private gatekeepers are getting used to adopting a precept denoted as ²comply or 
explain² in some quarters, and ²if-not, why-not² in others
8. What these expressions 
stand for can be briefly stated in the following way: 
                                                 
7 All over this paper, a construct becomes operational when, for its components and inner structure, 
there are procedures that bring them into practice.    
8 The Australian Stock Exchange chose the latter expression.   10 
If  certain  company  does  not  want  to  build a  code  of  good  practices,  it  has  for 
certain the right of not having one, but in such case it must explain why it would 
have none.   
 
 
5. THE SYDNEY STOCK EXCHANGE PROPOSAL  
 
In was in March 2003 that the Australian Securities Exchange through its “ASX 
Corporate  Governance  Council”,  issued  the  first  edition  of  a  document  entitled 
Corporate  Governance  Principles  and  Recommendations.  Profiting  from  later 
advice  and  feedback
9,  the  Council  brought  forward  the  second  edition  of  the 
document  in  August  2007,  which  took  effect  as  from  January  1,  2008.  In 
connection  with  the  expression  “recommendations”,  it  could  be  read  like 
²recommendation to enact good practices².  
 
Perhaps the most worthy feature of the Australian document consists in the fruitful 
choice of a few principles and recommendations, as well as in the unambiguous 
semantics used to frame each principle, eight on the whole, that are listed in the 
left column of Exhibit 1, section 6.1. In addition, and after each principle, a short list 
of recommendations or good practices follow, adding up to twenty seven practices 
in  all.  Lastly,  once  principles  and  recommendations  have  been  itemized,  the 
document delves into the logic behind of each principle and each recommendation.  
 
By all means, the ASX comes out as a remarkable proposal and, in my opinion, it 
seems the best available all over the world. We are going to highlight the main 
features  of  this  document,  stressing  its  ups  and  downs,  because  we  intend  to 
introduce a more comprehensive proposal, the Statute of Governance, which we 
need to contrast with the former as starkly as possible. 
 
                                                 
9 A code of good practices is not a single once-made-always-kept construct, and this is also true for 
principles of governance. Over time, they must be changed, updated, or amended,   11 
The  Australian  Corporate  Governance  Council  starts  by  defining  Corporate 
Governance in a way that it suits not only its objectives but also the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition. Accordingly, the Council says that 
 
Corporate  Governance  is  the  framework  of  rules,  relationships,  systems  and 
processes  within  and  by  which  authority  is  exercised  and  controlled  in 
corporations. 
 
It is our contention that such approach to governance issues seems consistent but 
too narrow whenever we establish similarities and differences with other available 
definitions. For instance, let us notice the following perspectives:  
 
·  Monks and Minow (1997) have stated that Corporate Governance deals with 
“the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations”;  
·  the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) laid the foundations 
for an influential notion of corporate governance
10;   
·  Professor Alma Whiteley (2007) chose an approach dealing with trust and 
the  employee  perspective:  “Corporate  Governance  is  concerned  with 
ensuring that managers run firms honestly and effectively so as to provide a 
fair and acceptable return to those who invest resources in them. [ … ] Trust 
refers  to  a  person’s  belief  that  others  make  sincere  efforts  to  uphold 
                                                 
10 In the OECD web page we found this definition (at the Glossary section): Corporate governance 
deals with the rights and responsibilities of a company’s management, its board, shareholders and 
various stakeholders.  How well companies are run affects market confidence as well as company 
performance.  Good corporate governance is therefore essential for companies that want access to 
capital and for countries that want to stimulate private sector investment.  If companies are well run, 
they  will  prosper.   This  in  turn  will  enable  them  to  attract  investors  whose  support  can  help  to 
finance  faster  growth.    Poor  corporate  governance  on  the  other  hand  weakens  a  company’s 
potential and at worst can pave the way for financial difficulties and even fraud.        12 
commitments  and  do  not  take  advantage  of  that  person  given  the 
opportunity”;  
·  lastly, our own definition in section 1. The extent to which the definitions 
from the ASX Council and this paper differ will have a direct bearing on our 
line of argument. 
 
 
6. THE STATUTE OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Whereas  codes  of  good  practices  are  well  spread  around  the  world  they  refer 
almost exclusively to listed companies, either financial or non-financial, which trade 
in  stocks  or  over-the-counter  exchanges.  Therefore,  the  codes  are  naturally 
constricted to a slim set of companies, most of them doing businesses in countries 
displaying the Anglo-Saxon style of governance
11. 
 
It is our viewpoint that we ought to give heed to any sort of companies, in any 
country. Overwhelmingly, most of those organizations do not issue securities to be 
placed through public offers, and their ownership structure hinges upon the so-
called  “closed  and  family-owned  companies”
12.  Furthermore,  it  does  not  seem 
sensible to limit the universe of organizations to profit-seekers only, in the quest of 
better practices. Hence, we must allow for mutuals, cooperatives, venture capital 
companies, state-owned firms, and foundations
13.  
 
Following our line of research, we advocate that a statute of governance is to be 
designed.  Such  statute  will  be  contingent  upon  the  agreement  of  the  board  of 
                                                 
11 On this account, see Lopez Iturriaga (2009) for an updated reference to codes around the world 
either for listed or non-listed companies. 
12  On  private  placements  and  closed  companies  the  contributions  by  Carey  et  al  (1993)  and 
Easterbrook-Fischel (1996) are conspicuous. 
13 Hansmann expands on this matter, and even assimilates a corporation to a cooperative.   13 
directors
14 and should be passed as a by-law through an ordinary meeting of the 
relevant owners. 
  
Definition 4    The Statute of Governance 
 
By  the  Statute  of  Governance  we  mean  a  construct  consisting  of  two  related 
components: 
 
-  the  principles  chosen  by  the  organization  as  the  foundation  of  its 
governance; 
 
-  the  practices  that  stem  from  each  principle  by  which  the  organization 
commits itself to make the latter fully operational.   
 
Besides, this construct must be set out by the board of directors, passed through 
an ordinary meeting of shareholders, enacted as a by-law of the organization and 
enforced by the board of directors and the senior management afterwards.  
 
We have to highlight some features actually embodied in the definition above. 
   
a) the Statute of Governance cannot be regarded only as a list of principles and 
good  practices  that  stand  apart  from  each  other,  but  there  is  a  focal 
correspondence  between  them,  in  the  sense  that  for  each  principle  the 
organization  commits  itself  to  formally  adopt  some  practices  linked  with  such 
principle;  
 
b)  it  is  for  the  board  of  directors  to  draw  up  the  Statute,  being  helped  on  this 
account by the senior management; 
 
                                                 
14  If  not  a  corporation,  we  mean  the  supervisory  body  that  fits  best  to  the  organization  under 
analysis.   14 
c)  it  is  for  the  board  of  directors  to  convene  a  formal  ordinary  meeting  of 
shareholders in order the Statute be assented, passed and lastly enacted as a by-
law of the organization; 
 
d) it is for the board of directors and the senior management to make the Statute 




Although having a code of good practices is good for any organization, this is not 
the final step to take. They must be rooted in principles, being this feature a major 
accomplishment in the ASX proposal. However, merely having a list of principles 
with attachable corporate practices does not lead to better governance, unless we 
build up the statute of governance that becomes a by-law for the organization. 
Commitment and enforcement is what brings the whole matter into completion.  
 
6.1 MAKING A CONTRAST WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PROPOSAL 
 
At this juncture a sharp distinction seems due and necessary between the proposal 
conveyed in this paper (SGP)
15 and the Australian proposal (AP). Needless to say, 
the contrast will resort to the most outstanding characteristics, without pretending 
to be exhaustive in any way. For the sake of the argument, Exhibit 1 will show the 
principles recommended by the Australian Stock Exchange on the left column, and 
the list of counterpart principles in the Statute of Governance in the right column. 
Let us move on the contrast. 
 
·  On the underlying definition of governance 
  
The  SGP  profits  from  a  wide-ranging  framework  of  governance  that  makes  it 
suitable for any kind of organization around the world, whereas the AP focuses on 
                                                 
15 Statute of Governance Proposal.   15 
listed companies in the Australian Stock Exchange loyal to an Anglo-Saxon style of 
governance. Furthermore, the SGP consists of a list of principles of governance 
rooted in the variables of analysis embraced in Definition 1. 
 
 
·  On a methodological distinction 
 
The AP neglects the imperative “must” that provides backing to any principle, and 
takes up the more lenient “should” instead. This is a debatable usage that might 
prevent principles from being seriously enacted in many countries where politicians 
unremittingly impair the institutional quality, and law enforcement seems open to 
doubt, to say the least. I feel that “should” comes in handy only when dealing with 
practices, which must be flexible of necessity.  
 
·  On the separateness of board and management  
 
Whereas in the AP first principle the role of the board and the role of management 
are overlapping, the SGP sets up three principles: the first one is concerned with 
owners rights (which I feel must be the starting principle in any conceivable list), 
next we have a principle devoted exclusively to the board of directors, and lastly, 
another one to stress the role of the senior management. 
 
In doing so, compliance of the big players with their fiduciary duties becomes a 
noticeable matter of accountability
16. Therefore, we highlight and link ownership 





                                                 
16 Basically, we mean the duties of diligence, loyalty and good faith. For further comments on this 
topic, see Flannigan (2004). 





Principles recommended by 
the Australian Stock Exchange 
 
 
Principles recommended for 
The Statute of Governance 
 
P1  Companies  should  establish  and 
disclose  the  respective  roles  and 
responsibilities  of  Board  and  those 
delegated to senior executive and disclose 
those functions. 
 
P2  Companies should have a Board of 
an  effective  composition,  size  and 
commitment  to  adequately  discharge  its 
responsibilities and duties. 
 
P3  Companies should actively promote 
ethical and responsible decision-making. 
 
P4  Companies should have a structure 
to  independently  verify  and  safeguard  the 
integrity of their financial reporting. 
 
P5  Companies  should  promote  timely 
and  balanced  disclosure  of  all  material 
matters concerning the company. 
 
P6  Companies should respect the rights 
of  shareholders  and  facilitate  the  effective 
exercise of those rights.  
 
P7  Companies  should  establish  a 
sound  system  of  risk  oversight  and 
management and internal control. 
 
P8  Companies  should  ensure  that  the 
level  and  composition  of  remuneration  is 
sufficient  and  reasonable  and  that  its 
relationship to performance is clear. 
 
 
P1. The company must safeguard owners¢  
rights and endorse their bid for value. 
 
P2. The board of directors must perform a 
fiduciary role toward the owners in the quest 
for  the  organization’s  value;  control  rights 
must be clearly stated.  
 
P3. The senior management must perform 
a  fiduciary  role  toward  the  board  of 
directors;  decision  rights  must  be  clearly 
defined. 
 
P4. The organization must be accountable. 
 
P5. The organization must be transparent. 
 
P6.  The  organization  must  preserve 
creditors¢ ownership rights.   
 
P7.  The  organization  must  cope  with, 
prevent  and  carefully  treat  conflicts  of 
interests  arising  from  its  relationships  with 
internal or external stakeholders. 
 
P8.  Suitable  incentives  and  remunerations 
programs  must  be  designed  to  reward 
performance  and  loyalty,  but  all  of  them 
must be contingent upon creation of value 
for the company. 
 
P9.  There  must  be  a  mindful  following  up 
and resolution of compliance risks. 
 
P10. The organization must care for and be 
accountable  to  internal  and  external 




   17 
Another point of contention arises when we spotlight P4 in the AP, which consists 
in a principle that builds up the audit committee to grant independence in board 
decision-making. We reason that such a principle should not be designed as a 
standalone one; instead, such committee ought to be included as a good practice 
in the principle that deals with the board of directors.  
 
·  On the commitments with creditors 
 
The AP seems to sidestep the fact that external finance in any organization raises 
a fiduciary role toward creditors. Broadly speaking, creditors involve bondholders
18, 
banks,  institutional  investors,  preferred  stockholders,  suppliers,  venture  capital, 
private equity investment funds, and institutional angels. 
 
In contrast, the SGP sets this important class of stakeholders apart and allows for 
the inclusion of covenants on behalf of creditors’ property rights
19.  
 
·  On the management of conflicts of interests 
 
Albeit  this  is  a  topical  matter,  it  does  not  seem  enough,  as  the AP  intends,  to 
assume  that  governance  deals  with  authority  and  control  only.  The  wave  of 
corporate scandals witness the failure of organizations founded only on the sole 
exercise of authority and control, by which opportunistic behavior like rent-seeking 
and soft-budget constraint
20 are utterly fostered eventually.  
 
Instead, corporate governance conveys a two-tiered structure. On the one hand, it 
provides the organization with a blueprint for its internal architecture; on the other 
hand, it establishes principles, practices, procedures and developments to meet 
goals or targets.    
                                                 
18 Plain bonds, or convertible bonds alike.  
19 Vehicles that foster corporate governance are enlarged upon in Apreda (2010, 2007b, 2004).  
20 On this see Apreda (2005).   18 
It  is  from  the  complex  web  of  relationships  between  the  organization  and 
stakeholders that conflict of interests lurk and arise, placing the company’s whole 
performance  in  jeopardy
21.  Coping  with  conflicts  of  interests  means  not  only  to 
master a clinical approach to them, but also to keep an agnostic mind
22.   
 
·  On accountability and transparency 
 
Accountability does not only refer to responsibilities but to commitments. It has 
been rewarding that in the last decade a wider notion of accountability was set in 
by  academics  and  practitioners,  eliciting  commitments  on  a  par  with 
responsibilities. Therefore, it is agreed that we are being held accountable to the 
extent of our success or failure in fulfilling previous commitments. 
 
As far as transparency is concerned, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2010, 1998) drafted the most standard and operational:  
 
Any kind of disclosed information will be regarded as transparent when it is 
comprehensive, timely, relevant, comparable, reliable, and material.  
 
·  On the handling of risks 
 
First of all, in the AP all sort of risks are treated as if they were alike. By all means, 
in the real world both financial and economic risks put a threat on the turnover of 
any company and, it goes without saying, careful and diligent managers have been 
handling them for decades so far. The problem is still harder when the company is 
a financial institution. But to hinge all risks upon a single principle of governance it 
seems farfetched, to say the least. 
 
                                                 
21 Conflicts of interests among the primary stakeholders are developed in Apreda (2007c , 2002). 
22 The clinical approach to organizations was introduced by Pranger (1965).   19 
To deal with this issue, a more suitable proposal was the one set forth by the Basel 
Bank  (2005)  that  defined  “compliance  risks”  as  those  which  follow  when  a 
company  fails  to  comply  with  regulations  and  internal  norms,  to  the  extent  of 
bringing about material consequences for the organization
23. Surely, risks of this 
kind should be treated in the realm of corporate governance by a principle like P9 
in the SGP, leaving for the Management Protocol the handling of non-compliance 
risks
24.      
 
·  On the remaining stakeholders 
 
Although P3 fixes up the issue of ethical and responsible decision making, it fails to 
reach the broader subject of the whole constituency to which the company commits 
to and will be held accountable for. That is to say, the AP stays focused only on 
three kinds of stakeholders: the board of directors, the senior management and the 
shareholders.  In  this  way,  creditors,  employees,  customers,  suppliers,  the 
government,  and  the  parties  related  to  environmental  problems  turn  out  to  be 
ancillary issues even under the guise of P3.  
 
On the side of the SGP, the remaining stakeholders are wholly included. Owing to 
their importance, relationships with creditors will deserve a distinctive principle, P6, 
whereas relationships with other stakeholders are specifically handled by P10. 
 
·  On the incentives and remunerations to senior management and the board 
 
Corporate scandals, epitomized by Enron’s demise and the credit crunch in 2008-
2009 convey a lesson that must be learnt once and for all when devising both the 
governance structure and the Statute of Governance. The AP seems to neglect 
                                                 
23 By material consequences, in this paper, we follow the Basilea’s definition (1998): information 
must  be  regarded  as  material  “if  its  omission  or  misstatement  could  change  or  influence  the 
assessment or decision of a user relying on that information.” 
24 Apreda (2007 and 2006b) handles the issue of compliance risk in non-financial institutions.   20 
such lesson and falls short of an innovative principle, by constraining P8 only to the 
engineering of an incentives and remuneration package.  
 
In point of fact, the SGP takes a step further and requests that incentives and 
remunerations be conditional upon whether they create or destroy economic value 
for  the  company.  In  doing  so,  short-termism,  rent-seeking,  and  soft-budget 
constraints,  become  contemptible  patterns  of  behavior  grounded  on  the 




7. A PRAGMATIC VIEWPOINT 
 
To assess the nature, scope and functionality of the Statute of Governance we are 
going to provide the reader with a complete sample of the construct. To keep our 
line of reasoning within a precise context, let us imagine that we have to produce 
such statute for a closed, family-owned company.    
 
·  Principle 1     
 
The company must safeguard the owners’ rights and endorse their bid for 
 value. 
 
Practice 1  A Stockholders Agreement will lead their relationships. For instance, 
the succession of the founding fathers or senior stockholders, the entrance of a 
new family member to the company, future reorganization processes, the role of 
minority stockholders, the board composition and control rights, mechanisms for 




                                                 
25 For further background, see Apreda (2008, 2005, 2002).     
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·  Principle 2 
 
The board of directors must perform a fiduciary role towards the owners in 
their quest for the organization’s value; control rights must be clearly stated.  
 
Practice 1  A Board Protocol is to be approved by stockholders, comprising the 
nature  of  control  rights  to  be  delegated,  the  board's  composition,  activities  and 
frequency  of  its  meetings,  agenda  setting,  and  delegated  decision  rights  to  the 
senior management.  
 
Practice 2  The board will have two independent directors at least; the CEO can 
be appointed executive director but not chair of the board.  
 
Practice 3  There will be an Auditing Committee, ruled by a particular Protocol, 
which  states  the  committee’s  functions,  goals,  and  authority.  There  will  have 
majority  of  independent  directors,  and  one  of  them  will  sit  as  chair  of  such 
Committee. 
 
Practice 4  Directors  are  to  be  replaced  by  means  of  a  staggering  process. 
Training and qualifications of directors will be depicted in the Board Protocol.  
 
·  Principle 3 
 
The senior management must perform a fiduciary role toward the board of 
directors; decision rights must be clearly defined. 
 
Practice 1  A  Senior  Management  Protocol  is  to  be  approved  by  the  board, 
comprising the management structure, activities, tasks schedule, agenda setting, 
delegated decision rights, as well as the relationship with the board of directors.  
 
   22 
Practice 2  There will be an Executive Council, led by the CEO, to follow up the 
daily  operations  of  the  going  concern  as  well  as  the  bringing  into  practice  of 
strategic decision making, as requested by the board of directors. 
 
Practice 3  Commitments and responsibilities expected from all members in the 
Executive  Council  will  be  included  in  the  Management  Protocol,  as  well  as 
procedures to measure the performance and compliance of managers in their jobs.   
 
·  Principle 4 
     
The organization must be accountable. 
 
Practice 1  The senior management will design an Accountability System within 
and without the company, clearly defining commitments and responsibilities. It is 
the task of the Executive Council to follow up and redress the wrongs that could 
arise in such system of accountability. 
 
Practice 2  It is for the board to authorize the design of the Accountability System 
of  accountability,  to  control  at  least  once  a  year  the  compliance  of  the  senior 
management  with  the  system,  and  to  request  the  updating  or  changes  in  such 
system. 
 
·  Principle 5   
   
The organization must be transparent. 
 
Practice 1  The  senior  management  must  design  a  Protocol  of  Transparency 
pointing to transparency priorities in the company. The protocol must be flexible, to 
allow for upgrades or changes when requested by the board of directors.  
 
Practice 2  It  is  for  the  board  of  directors  to  authorize  the  Protocol  of 
Transparency and control its implementation at least once a year.   23 
Practice 3  To  put  into  practice  the  Protocol  of  Transparency,  the  senior 
management will be responsible for setting up a whole Internal Control System, 
and the CEO will be held accountable for such system to the Auditing Committee. 
 
·  Principle 6   
   
The organization must preserve creditors¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ownership rights.   
 
Practice 1  For  each  debt  contract,  there  will  be  attached  a  suitable  set  of 
covenants (protective safeguards). 
 
Practice 2  For  each  debt  contract,  it  will  be  for  the  Auditing  Committee  to 
assess, reject or approve the issuance of debt that surpasses an established level. 
The  Senior  Management  Protocol  will  state  the  amount  of  debt  that  would  not 
require the approval of the Auditing Committee. 
 
Practice 3  When issuing convertible bonds or convertible preferred stock, it will 
be for the stockholders to approve not only the issuance but also the attachable 
covenants.  
 
·  Principle 7   
   
The  organization  must  cope  with,  prevent,  and  carefully  treat  conflicts  of 
interests arising from its relationships with internal or external stakeholders. 
 
Practice 1  The senior management will draft, implement, and follow up a Clinical 
Approach System to conflicts of interests
26. 
 
Practice 2  It  is  for  the  Auditing  Committee  to  approve  the  diagnosis  and 
treatment suggested for the senior management to cope with strategic conflicts of 
                                                 
26 See Pranger (1965).   24 
interest,  whereas  the  senior  management  will  be  held  accountable  for  tactical 
conflicts of interest. 
 
Practice 3  If  conflicts  of  interest  arose  from  the  relationship  between 
stockholders and (or) members of the board, the final decision should lie upon a 
general stockholders meeting. 
 
Practice 4  If the conflict of interest stemmed from the Statute of Governance, or 
the Stockholders Agreement, they would be changed only by convening a general 
stockholders meeting. 
 
·  Principle 8 
     
Suitable incentive and remuneration programs must be designed to reward 
performance and loyalty, but all of them must be contingent upon creation of 
value for the company. 
 
Practice 1  The  board  of  directors  will  set  up  a  Nomination,  Incentives  and 
Remunerations Committee, comprising at least three members of the board, with 
majority of independent directors. Neither the CEO nor any executive director will 
belong to the committee. 
 
Practice 2  The  senior  management  will  design  a  system  of  performance 
measures that must be approved by the board of directors. The system must be 
flexible, attainable, changeable, and always contingent upon value creation
27. 
 
Practice 3  Any system of incentives and remunerations that involves ordinary or 
preferred  stock,  as  well  as  convertible  bonds,  should  become  operational  only 
when meeting the approval of the majority of stockholders. 
                                                 
27  Overwhelming  evidence  out  of  corporate  scandals  show  that,  at  the  root  of  those  shameful 
events, we always find a purposeful scheme to destroy value.   25 
·  Principle 9   
 
There must be a mindful following up and resolution of compliance risks. 
 
Practice 1  The  senior  management  will  design  a  managerial  function  called 
Compliance  Office,  which  will  deal  with  compliance  risks.  It  is  for  the  board  of 
directors to approve the function, the Compliance Officer to be appointed, and the 
budget of the new office. 
 
Practice 2  The Compliance Officer will behave with independence, exclusively 
reporting  to  the  CEO,  and  will  get  access  to  any  kind  of  information  from  any 
section that he needed to fulfill his functions. However, in extraordinary or sensitive 
situations, the Compliance Officer can directly take his complaints to the Auditing 
Committee eventually. 
 
Practice 3  Every  year,  the  Compliance  Office  will  submit  a  Statement  of 
Compliance  to  the  CEO,  to  be  assessed  and  finally  approved  by  the  Auditing 
Committee. 
 
·  Principle 10  
 
The organization must care for and be accountable to internal and external 
stakeholders as well. 
 
Practice 1  The senior management is responsible for the drafting, implementing, 
and  following  up  of  a  Social  Responsibility  Statute,  which  must  be  ratified  and 
endorsed by the board of directors. 
 
Practice 2  The  senior  management  is  responsible  for  the  drafting, 
implementation, and following up of a Code of Conduct for internal stakeholders, 
which must be ratified and endorsed by the board of directors. 
   26 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Governance matters and that is why stockholders, directors, and managers must 
honor their pledges of commitments and responsibilities.  
 
But  accountability  involves  bringing  to  light  principles  that  lay  the  foundation  of 
corporate governance, as well as good practices to enable those principles to be 
put into practice. 
 
This  paper  has  developed  and  argued  that  a  suitable  construct  to  enhance 
corporate  governance  is  the  Statute  of  Governance,  which  resembles  a 
constitutional  device  within  the  company,  a  by-law  in  point  of  fact,  that  links 
principles  and  practices  by  means  of  an  enforceable  vehicle  to  be  followed  by 
stockholders, directors and managers. 
 
Lastly,  and  by  way  of  illustration,  the  paper  includes  a  material  statute  of 
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